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Arnold v Britton [2015]1 clarified that where the language of a contract is 
unambiguous the literalist interpretation of the wording will outweigh the 
principle of commercial common sense. The subject of the litigation was a 
deceptively reasonable service charge clause included in 25 lease agreements 
at £90 a year, which increased by 10 percent compound interest per annum. Due 
to the high rate of inflation at the time the contracts were entered into, the 
service charge increased exponentially reaching extortionate rates. Deciding in 
favour of the landlord, the court marks a shift to a more conservative approach to 
contractual interpretation, which centers on textual analysis with less regard to 
external context2. But beyond updating the rules of construction, the exercise of 
balancing literalism and business common sense has served as a lighthouse, 
illuminating the often-treacherous waves that govern commercial relations. The 
Lords’ have deliberated whether commercial sensibilities should be allowed to 
interfere with the function of a competently drafted service charge and an 
answer has been reached. However, by favoring the commercially nonsensical 
interpretation of the provision in question, the Supreme Court has 
underestimated the value of ensuring amicability and fairness in business 
relations. The lingering question that remains unanswered and unchallenged is; 
what commercial behavior is the Supreme Court condoning by choosing to 
enforce this agreement? 
 
REASONABLENESS OF THE JUDGEMENT 
 
Historically, English principles of contractual interpretation have been perceived 
as strictly literalist. Contractual interpretation is considered the ‘ascertainment 
of meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person’3 with 
access to all relevant background information. Generally, English courts are 
reluctant to stray away from the natural meaning of an agreement, where the 
language used is clear. In this case, the wording of the clause in question was 
identified as unambiguous, leaving little room for a different interpretation. 
Also, it is important to note that the question of fairness is unimportant as 
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English law ‘does not often accept that people have made linguistic mistakes’4 
and courts avoid using their red pen to rectify a bad bargain. Interpretation is 
the exercise of identifying what the parties have agreed, not what the court 
thinks they should have agreed. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision to 
assent to the commercially absurd interpretation was justifiable, as the danger 
of deciding otherwise would render legal relations in the business world volatile 
and risky. If plain words cannot be trusted, drafters would face an impossible 
task. Such was the opinion of Lord Neuberger who delivered the majority 
judgement, emphasizing that ‘the language of the clause was simply ‘too clear’ as 
to lend itself to a different interpretation. He was reluctant to consider the 
agreement as commercially inconceivable given that inflation had been running 
over ten percent between 1974 and 19815, meaning that this unfair result could 
have occurred to the detriment of either party. The purpose of this analysis is not 
to condemn the decision of the Supreme Court, but to underline certain 
implications that may pose a danger to future commercial relations.  
 
ROLE OF COMMERCIAL COMMON SENSE  
 
The precedents of commercial common sense have emerged in cases were the 
court is required to navigate the murky waters of an ambiguous agreement. In 
its genesis it was held that ‘detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words’6, 
which leads to a conclusion that is contrary to business common sense, must 
yield to the commercially probable interpretation. Opposing pedantry, it cuts 
through language that is commercially ambiguous and is hostile to technical 
interpretations and linguistic niceties7. In principle, business common sense 
clears the fog of a linguistically ambiguous contract granting flexibility in the 
process of construction. However, the judgement in Britton reflects the law’s 
reluctance to rely on this concept in the fear of disrupting the continuity of 
English case law. 
 
The service charge clause consisted of two parts, a descriptive part and a 
quantifying part. Lord Neuberger accepted that there was potential conflict 
between the two parts of the clause but rejected the lessee’s argument that the 
first half should be interpreted as imposing a cap in order to avoid a 
commercially absurd result. Favouring the landlords fixed-rate interpretation, 
implies that commercial common sense can also be employed as a vehicle of 
deception. Just as technical language can conceal the consequences of an 
agreement, similarly CCS can also be used as a ‘camouflage for partisan 
arguments’8, which are really pleas for escaping a bad bargain. The majority held 
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that ‘the natural meaning of the words used was clear’: the first half of the clause 
stipulated for an annual charge and the second part quantified that charge. This 
interpretation of the second half of clause 3(2) was understandable as a variable 
charge would give rise to many future disputes regarding proportionality. On the 
contrary, Lord Carnwath’s advocation for a commercially sensible result was 
acknowledged but ultimately rejected as this would mean ‘inventing a lack of 
clarity’9 to depart from the natural meaning of the clause. By doing so, the 
majority’s insistence on protecting the continuity of English case law and the 
clear wording of the agreement, was viewed as a higher priority than enforcing 
commercial logic. It is this very continuity in contractual interpretation which 
protects commercial parties by enforcing the virtues of certainty and 
predictability in business relations10. Paradoxically, the pursuit for continuity 
may instead have the effect of muddying the waters of future construction as 
courts will not always have the luxury of a singular clear interpretation. The 
majorities conditioning of commercial common sense as a variable dependent on 
the degree of ambiguity may inspire a heightened need for rectification in 
similarly ambiguous agreements, and of course the amount of red ink available 
is always limited.  
 
LACK OF FACTUAL MATRIX  
 
From a superficial perspective, the decision to undermine the importance of this 
concept in business agreements may be understood as a reminder to lower courts 
that commercial common sense is not to be employed in unambiguous contracts. 
However, the question of whether an agreement is commercially sound is to be 
determined by inquiry to the overall purpose and provisions of a contract11. The 
contention that business common sense should not be ‘invoked retrospectively’ to 
avoid offending the natural language of the clause in question appears rather 
reaching. Pragmatically, not all judges possess the business acumen required to 
decipher what constitutes a commercially sensible agreement. This is especially 
true in agreements were the language used lends itself to multiple competing 
interpretations. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate the factual matrix 
behind a transaction, to avoid de-valuing the commercial implications of an 
absurd result. 
 
The question of whether to draw or conceal the proverbial sword of “commercial 
common sense” can be better determined by inquiry to overall purpose of the 
agreement12; a resource the Supreme Court had limited access to, due to the lack 
of “factual matrix”, which includes any information that was available to the 
parties at the time the contract was entered into. In other words, the decision to 
undermine the authority of business good sense, while necessary, appears 
rudderless as the majority had insufficient material to justify this approach.  
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Apart from information about inflation, no other information was available for 
the majority to justify negating such a crucial agent of commercial 
interpretation. There was no clause in the agreement which calculated the 
possible exponential growth of the service charge. A measure which would have 
benefited both parties, if the majorities contention that the risk was mutual was 
indeed true (due to the high inflation of the 1970’s). As established in Rainy Sky 
[2011], the process of construction requires the court to consider the language 
used having ‘regard to all the relevant surrounding circumstances’13. So, the 
majority’s reluctance to employ business common sense may be an indicator that 
they were ill-equipped to do so. But, evading the spotlight of abolishing a crucial 
tool of construction comes at the cost of thinning the line that the separates 
commercially unattractive agreements and undeniably absurd clauses, which 
clearly do not reflect the intention of the parties involved.  
 
UNEXPLORED AMBIGUITIES IN THE AGREEMENT  
 
To continue venturing into a credible rhetoric of skepticism without appearing 
redundant, one must assess the lack of factual matrix in line with the inherent 
ambiguities in the lease agreement. These ambiguities were highlighted in Lord 
Carnwath’s dissenting judgement, advocating for the court to adopt the 
commercially logical interpretation. For example, the covenant requires the 
tenant to pay an annual service charge of £90 subject to exponential growth since 
1974, while the alteration was made in 1980. In other words, the tenant is 
agreeing to pay six years of service charge before the lease was granted14. A 
result which runs contrary to the logic of a “reasonable commercial person”. Also, 
the “triennial” covenants included in the early leases, contained the words “every 
subsequent Three-year period” instead of “every subsequent year”. Whether 
these ambiguities allude that the variation of the leases were subsisting a loss 
incurred in the early leases is an argument Lord Carnwath was ill-equipped to 
employ. As asserted by Lord Neuberger, the court would not endeavor ‘inventing 
a lack of clarity in the clause as an excuse for departing from its natural 
meaning’15 as this would mean rewriting an unambiguous agreement. 
Additionally, there was no evidence available regarding the actual expenditure 
given by the landlord on meeting her obligations under the provision of the lease, 
whereas the escalator clause was quantified far more precisely. These minor 
details, when viewed together, may indeed legitimize the contention of ill-will. 
Naturally, no authority with the stature of the Supreme Court would dare 
navigate the potentially hazardous avenue of unilaterally altering the 
historically accepted nature of the English contract in order to emphasize the 
real intention of the parties. Ultimately, the clarity of the language used renders 
any rhetoric regarding ill-intent, futile, as the court would not undermine the 
clear language of a commercial agreement in order to facilitate such rhetoric. For 
this reason, no court though these ambiguities substantially material. 
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WHAT COMMERCIAL BEHAVIOUR IS BEING 
CONDONED? 
 
Returning to the initial question regarding the commercial principles the 
Supreme Court is allowing to prosper, it is likely that future matters of 
heightened linguistic ambiguity will emerge. Given the futility of Parliamentary 
intervention, due to the adverse impact this would have on many mixed-use 
developments16, it is evident that the common law has a monopoly on writing the 
frameworks of construction. In Britton, Lord Neuberger emphasized seven 
factors to be employed in contractual interpretation. The weight of these 
frameworks is not to be undermined, as the Supreme Court is not only clarifying 
the rules of interpretation but is also implying (avoiding blatantly admitting) 
that mistakes have been made in prior cases of construction. An example of this 
is the implied correction of the approach in Aberdeen17 (6th factor), in which 
Neuberger claimed that the clear intention of the parties will be given effect over 
other interpretations. This seems to run contrary to the result of Britton, which 
disregards the concept of “reasonable commercial intention” to avoid offending 
the clarity of the agreement. Most problematically, the second factor states that 
where the drafting of an agreement is clear, the court must not search for 
‘infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning’18 [18]. In 
less polished words, it is justified to assent to an interpretation that is clear even 
where this clarity stems from an ambiguous agreement, with a commercially 
absurd result and with limited liberty to the matrix of fact. By favoring the 
landlord’s interpretation, the court is inadvertently limiting its flexibility in 
regard to future construction.  The same clarity that outweighed all other 
considerations in the present matter, may be used as a tool to facilitate 
improbable agreements, in such a way as to allow pedantic parties to overthrow 




Although the decision in Arnold v Britton did not alter the underlying principles 
of construction, it shed light to the hierarchy of the components to be used in the 
interpretation of an unambiguous agreement. It is now evident that the clear 
wording of an agreement will supersede commercial infelicities and linguistic 
ambiguities. But, by laying the foundations of such a rigid interpretive 
autonomy, the Supreme Court is effectively better enabling ill-willed parties to 
monopolize the process of construction, using the overtly elevated judicial status 
of “clear language” in a contract as a tool to legitimize absurd interpretations. 
The exercise of clarifying the contemporarily accepted rules of construction has 
occurred at the detriment of other crucial variables.  
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More recent litigious proceedings have alluded that a mistake may have been 
made in the judgement of Britton. In the case of Monsolar IQ Ltd v Woden Park 
Ltd [2021]19, the Court of Appeal rejected the absurd interpretation of an 
indexation clause in a lease agreement, which clearly did not reflect the 
intentions of the parties. Ambivalence is evident on whether the Court of Appeal 
has received or accepted the message left by Britton, as Nugee LJ rejected the 
contention that Arnold v Britton had modified the Chartbook20 principle, which 
states that commercial common sense may indeed outweigh the literal 
interpretation of wording. Though not binding upon the Supreme Court, the case 
of Monsolar is didactic of the fact that the line which separates commercially 
imprudent provisions and nonsensical clauses may indeed be thinning.  I believe 
the Supreme Court has undermined the existence of pedantry amongst 
commercial parties, seeking to dominate the process of construction by adhering 
to the hierarchical structure of interpretative components set out in Britton in a 
way as to serve their own benefit. The rainy sky may have dried up, but the 
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